Another blog post written on a train. This time written in the morning on the train to London, to be uploaded to the blog later when I get home.
I've just finished reading Luttwak's "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" and rereading Sewter's translation of Psellos' "Chronographia". I found Luttwak's latest much less persuasive than his "Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire" of 30 years ago. That book made a strong case for a rational outline of Roman grand strategy. The current work felt far less coherent. Nor does he make the case which I expected him to around the applicability of the Byzantine approach to strategy in a world where our enemies can never truly be 'beaten' in the Napoleonic sense. I thought the one point he does make fairly coherently - that the Byzantines understood the states and peoples around them and adjusted their thinking to suit - is made more concisely in the last section of the "Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies". Still an enjoyable read though.
It was also interesting that I could read echoes of this in the later sections of Chronographia - particularly from Isaac Comnenos on - where, reading between the lines, it seems evident that Psellos is a practitioner of this grand strategy. I can't give the reference as I don't have the book with me, but there is a section where he talks about building allies with the peoples north of the Danube preparatory to military action in the East.
What struck me more though on this reading of Psellos, again in the sections from Isaac onwards, was the conflict between the military and civil parties. I'm not sure to what extent this is still part of current thinking on 11th. century Byzantium, but Psellos seems to clearly outline the beginnings of the run down to the capture of the state by the feudal aristocracy - with Isaac and Romanos IV being 'forerunners'. To pick up Alan Harvey's theories, as the economy expands, the civil aristocracy increasingly promotes this changing economy bringing it into conflict with the landed nobility. This aristocracy based more on land, military prowess, and informal 'feudal' relationships becomes more prevalent, and cannot tolerate the changes being encouraged by the civil party - and to some extent the diminution of it's role in the changed strategic situation of the 11th. century (see the treatment of the generals leading to Isaac's revolt). It captures the state to promote it's own narrow class interest - leading eventually to a catastrophic change in grand strategy (Romanos IV war in the East, bolstering a class based on military exploits in the East).
I would argue that this supports a Marxist view of 11th. century Byzantine history. Economic change and development leading to a revolutionary change as different classes vie for control of the mechanisms of government. Alexios then is not the hero who saves the state, but the confirmation of the victory of the military feudal class.
I think you can see some of this happening in the later sections of Psellos.
I've just finished reading Luttwak's "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" and rereading Sewter's translation of Psellos' "Chronographia". I found Luttwak's latest much less persuasive than his "Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire" of 30 years ago. That book made a strong case for a rational outline of Roman grand strategy. The current work felt far less coherent. Nor does he make the case which I expected him to around the applicability of the Byzantine approach to strategy in a world where our enemies can never truly be 'beaten' in the Napoleonic sense. I thought the one point he does make fairly coherently - that the Byzantines understood the states and peoples around them and adjusted their thinking to suit - is made more concisely in the last section of the "Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies". Still an enjoyable read though.
It was also interesting that I could read echoes of this in the later sections of Chronographia - particularly from Isaac Comnenos on - where, reading between the lines, it seems evident that Psellos is a practitioner of this grand strategy. I can't give the reference as I don't have the book with me, but there is a section where he talks about building allies with the peoples north of the Danube preparatory to military action in the East.
What struck me more though on this reading of Psellos, again in the sections from Isaac onwards, was the conflict between the military and civil parties. I'm not sure to what extent this is still part of current thinking on 11th. century Byzantium, but Psellos seems to clearly outline the beginnings of the run down to the capture of the state by the feudal aristocracy - with Isaac and Romanos IV being 'forerunners'. To pick up Alan Harvey's theories, as the economy expands, the civil aristocracy increasingly promotes this changing economy bringing it into conflict with the landed nobility. This aristocracy based more on land, military prowess, and informal 'feudal' relationships becomes more prevalent, and cannot tolerate the changes being encouraged by the civil party - and to some extent the diminution of it's role in the changed strategic situation of the 11th. century (see the treatment of the generals leading to Isaac's revolt). It captures the state to promote it's own narrow class interest - leading eventually to a catastrophic change in grand strategy (Romanos IV war in the East, bolstering a class based on military exploits in the East).
I would argue that this supports a Marxist view of 11th. century Byzantine history. Economic change and development leading to a revolutionary change as different classes vie for control of the mechanisms of government. Alexios then is not the hero who saves the state, but the confirmation of the victory of the military feudal class.
I think you can see some of this happening in the later sections of Psellos.
